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Abstract
Background: When an outbreak of a novel pathogen occurs, some of the most pressing questions from a public-
health point of view relate to its transmissibility, and the probabilities of different clinical outcomes following
infection, to allow an informed response. Estimates of these quantities are often based on household data due to
the high potential for transmission in this setting, but typically a rich spectrum of individual-level outcomes (from
uninfected to serious illness) are simplified to binary data (infected or not). We address the added benefit from
retaining the heterogeneous outcome information in the case of the 2009-10 influenza pandemic, which posed
particular problems for estimation of key epidemiological characteristics due to its relatively mild nature and hence
low case ascertainment rates.
Methods: We use mathematical models of within-household transmission and case ascertainment, together with
Bayesian statistics to estimate transmission probabilities stratified by household size, the variability of infectiousness
of cases, and a set of probabilities describing case ascertainment. This novel approach was applied to data we
collected from the early “containment phase” stage of the epidemic in Birmingham, England. We also conducted a
comprehensive review of studies of household transmission of influenza A(H1N1)pdm09.
Results: We find large variability in the published estimates of within-household transmissibility of influenza A
(H1N1)pdm09 in both model-based studies and those reporting secondary attack rates, finding that these
estimates are very sensitive to how an infected case is defined. In particular, we find that reliance on laboratory
confirmation alone underestimates the true number of cases, while utilising the heterogeneous range of outcomes
(based on case definitions) for household infections allows a far more comprehensive pattern of transmission to be
elucidated.
Conclusions: Differences in household sizes and how cases are defined could account for an appreciable
proportion of the reported variability of within-household transmissibility of influenza A(H1N1)pdm09. Retaining
and statistically analysing the full spectrum of individual-level outcomes (based on case definitions) rather than
taking a potentially arbitrary threshold for infection, provides much-needed additional information. In a future
pandemic, our approach could be used as a real-time analysis tool to infer the true number of cases, within-
household transmission rates and levels of case ascertainment.
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Introduction
Emerging infectious diseases remain an ongoing and ser-
ious threat to human health. Determining the appropriate
and measured response to any new threat is often guided
by mathematical models, which critically depend on good
estimates of key epidemiological parameters, such as
transmission rates, case ascertainment and case severity.
For respiratory pathogens such as influenza, the potential
for a global pandemic is always present, however the early
estimation of how virulent and transmissible a given
organism may be remains extremely difficult. This is pri-
marily because mild cases do not typically present them-
selves to the public health system, and so there is always
the possibility that severe cases will be considered more
typical than they actually are. The UK Department of
Health currently emphasises the need to ascertain severity
of a novel pandemic as soon as possible [1]. Uncertainty
regarding the severity of the recent 2009 H1N1 pandemic,
which was relatively mild in most cases compared to pre-
vious pandemics such as that in 1918-19, was a key pro-
blem for early efforts to estimate the epidemiological
quantities necessary to inform public health policy [2,3].
Household data has formed a key part of efforts to
estimate quantities relevant to the transmission
dynamics of pandemic influenza [4,5]. The household is
a natural unit for collection of epidemiological data for
three main reasons. First, by definition members of a
household are co-located and so are readily studied at
the same time. Secondly, the close contacts between
household members often lead to strong within-house-
hold transmission that provides rich information for sta-
tistical outbreak analysis. Finally, many interventions
such as antiviral prophylaxis, treatment and isolation
advice are often considered for targeting at the house-
hold level [6,7]. Households therefore form epidemiolo-
gically important units that are convenient to sample.
In this study, we use data on a large number of house-
holds (424) in Birmingham (England’s second city and
an early hotspot of the epidemic) affected during the
first seven weeks of the 2009 H1N1 pandemic, to esti-
mate within-household transmissibility, heterogeneity in
infectiousness of cases, and the accuracy (given by a set
of four probabilities) of case ascertainment.
We also carried out a comprehensive review of house-
hold-based studies, which were typically undertaken
early in the pandemic. The overwhelming majority of
these did not estimate transmission probabilities
between individuals, but instead reported crude second-
ary attack rates (SARs, see Additional file 1: Literature
Review for a formal definition) amongst household con-
tacts of initially detected individuals. While this
approach is natural in the context of an emerging and
rapidly growing pandemic, accurate estimation of trans-
mission intensity allows more general conclusions to be
obtained, which can inform public health management
strategies. This is because SARs arise as a result of inter-
action between the biological process of transmission
and the socio-demographic structure of a population.
Estimation of the transmission probabilities indepen-
dently of the demographic structure, as presented here,
therefore allows more general conclusions to be drawn.
The feature that sets our study apart from previous
work is the combined use of multiple case definitions.
In the majority of situations, public-health investigations
of household infections record many observations about
the individuals’ health and symptoms. Then this rich
information is generally converted to a binary outcome
(infected or not) according to a strict case definition,
with such definitions typically varying between different
public-health bodies. Here we develop a methodology
that can be applied whenever plausible case definitions
form a nested hierarchy as shown in Figure 1, and show
how retaining the individual-level heterogeneous data
allows us to compute the likely true infections and the
errors associated with different case definitions.
Methods
We now present the protocols used to obtain data dur-
ing the early phase of the 2009 pandemic. The key fea-
tures of these protocols will apply in many different
outbreak scenarios. These protocols motivated our sta-
tistical methodology, which is also described below.
Data collection
During the initial phase of the pandemic in 2009 in the
UK, suspected cases of influenza A(H1N1)pdm09 were
reported to the Health Protection Agency (HPA) by
general practitioners. Individuals meeting a strict case
definition were classified as ‘possible’ cases of influenza
A(H1N1)pdm09 [8]. The case definition included pre-
sence of fever or history of fever, and two other speci-
fied flu-like symptoms or other severe illness consistent
with influenza infection. Epidemiological criteria were
included in the case definition in addition to clinical cri-
teria and related to recent travel to high incidence areas
and contact with other laboratory confirmed cases of
influenza A or influenza A(H1N1)pdm09 infection. Pos-
sible cases were prescribed antiviral treatment and had
nasal and/or throat swabs taken in order to confirm the
diagnosis, which was done using real-time PCR (RT-
PCR) methods. All household contacts of laboratory-
confirmed cases were subsequently prescribed antiviral
prophylaxis, and any symptomatic contacts meeting the
case definition were managed as ‘possible’ cases.
Detailed demographic and clinical information regarding
suspected cases and the household contacts of labora-
tory-confirmed cases was collected by the HPA during
this early period, known as the containment phase.
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In Birmingham, BADGER (Birmingham and District
General Practitioner Emergency Rooms - a cooperative
of local general practitioners) which currently provides
out-of-hours primary care services in the city, were
commissioned by the local primary care trusts (health
administrative organizations) to set up the Birmingham
Flu Service. The staff was initially commissioned to
undertake testing for H1N1 of patients referred by the
HPA with likely symptoms. Subsequently they under-
took the case management of possible cases of H1N1
and their household contacts (in this case using the
standard definition of households as individuals sharing
living arrangements) including taking nose/throat swab
samples and providing antiviral prophylaxis and treat-
ment. This testing involved all suspected cases of H1N1
(and their household contacts) notified to the HPA by
all general practitioners (family doctors) within the Bir-
mingham Primary Care Trust area, and as such should
sample representatively the H1N1 cases in general
population of Birmingham, although there is the possibi-
lity of differential reporting by population subgroups.
The first laboratory-confirmed case seen by the clinic,
with a documented illness onset date, reported becom-
ing unwell on 5 May 2009. The West Midlands region,
which covers a broad area of central England consisting
of both rural and urban areas (including Birmingham)
had its first reported case on 30 April 2009.
On 19 June 2009 several postcode areas in Birming-
ham were identified as ‘hotspots’ or areas of sustained
community transmission, and on 23 June 2009 Birming-
ham as a whole was declared a hotspot. Alternative
management strategies were adopted from 19 June 2009
onwards: individuals were treated with antivirals on the
basis of clinical suspicion rather than laboratory confir-
mation if they were contacts of a confirmed case. From
26 June 2009 onwards swabbing and contact tracing
Figure 1 Non-mathematical explanation of the method used. Risk pyramids are shown on the left and households on the right. Top: If cases
and non-cases are straightforwardly ascertained, then within-household transmission will tend to cluster the cases so that there are either many
or few cases within a household. Bottom: The presence of further stratification complicates the picture if information is only available on one
outcome, but if full information is available, the clustering of cases by household is still visible and gives an accurate picture of transmission.
Case ascertainment is not explicitly represented in this cartoon, but the principle is similar.
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ceased in hotspot areas and individuals were treated on
the basis of clinical suspicion alone. The data presented
here are based on information collected by the BADGER
Flu Clinic and the HPA regarding the initial laboratory-
confirmed cases, and their household contacts, seen by
clinic staff. Data include index cases with reported dates
of illness onset and antiviral treatment commencement
(where reported) between 5 May 2009 and 18 June
2009, before the change in management strategy was
announced. Index cases without illness onset dates are
also included in the analysis, 45 of whom may or may
not have had dates of onset within the above-defined
timeframe. There will also have been a number of con-
tacts who would have been identified after 18 June
2009. These cases and contacts may have, therefore,
been treated on the basis of clinical suspicion, rather
than swabbed. Information regarding 424 initial cases
(in 424 separate households) and their 1,612 household
contacts was used to generate the data for analysis. Spe-
cific information extracted for the purposes of this study
included broad postcode area of the households, details
regarding presence of symptoms in contacts, whether
swabs had been taken (that is, the individual met the
case definition) and associated laboratory results.
Statistical analysis
Our data involve counts of the number of cases in house-
holds of different sizes. Appropriate probabilistic models
for such ‘final-size’ data were presented in a paper by Ball
[9]. To deal with these mathematically sophisticated
models, we make use of Bayesian Markov Chain-Monte
Carlo for statistical analysis [10], which was proposed as
a method for dealing with household final-size epidemic
data by O’Neill and Roberts [11]. To calculate the likeli-
hood requires two pieces of information: the actual num-
ber of cases in each household, and a distribution
describing the population-level heterogeneity in infec-
tiousness. For the latter of these, we use a Gamma distri-
bution as a simple, parametric choice. For the former, we
have no ‘gold standard’ test that gives the actual number
of cases; instead, for each household we have:
n Household size.
k3 Symptomatic individuals with at least one symp-
tom suggestive of an acute respiratory infection
(ARI).
k2 Swabbed individuals, who should have met the
case definition of fever and two or more other symp-
toms according to the HPA algorithm.
k1 Laboratory-confirmed cases, where PCR testing
of the swab returned a positive result.
Note that for any individual household, k1 ≤ k2 ≤ k3 ≤ n.
The histograms showing these data are plotted in Figure 2.
The intuition behind our approach is given in Figure 1:
within-household transmission gives a distinctive, clus-
tered, pattern to the distribution of cases in households
that can be broken by stratification of cases. Use of full
information does, however, allow accurate epidemiological
information to be obtained. Our full methodology is quite
technical and is detailed in Additional file 2: Technical
Appendix. The quantities that we estimate (in statistical
language, our model parameters) are, however, straightfor-
ward to interpret:
Tn Probability of transmission between an infectious
and a susceptible individual in a household of size n
(defined unambiguously in Additional file 2).
θ Variance in infectiousness of H1N1pdm09 cases.
p Probability that a swab of an H1N1pdm09 case
does not return positive.
q Probability that a symptomatic H1N1pdm09 case
is not swabbed.
r Probability that a symptomatic non-H1N1pdm09
individual is swabbed.
s Probability that a non-H1N1pdm09 individual has
symptoms - this is essentially the baseline prevalence
of symptoms indicative of non-H1N1pdm09 ARI.
Perfect case ascertainment therefore corresponds to the
situation where p and q are both zero, and it is obviously
also desirable for r and s to be zero. We check that our
methodology arrives at accurate parameter values for sev-
eral simulated datasets with different parameter values in
Additional file 2.
For the recent pandemic, we have made the assumptions
that case ascertainment through swabbing and laboratory
confirmation does not lead to false positives, and that to
acquire immunity or transmit infection individuals must
be symptomatic. In terms of the latter assumption, while
there is evidence for asymptomatic seroconversion
[12-14], our definition of symptomatic cases is particularly
inclusive, and could include, for example, individuals with
only a sore throat and no fever. Whether seroconversion
is possible without even extremely mild symptoms, and if
it is, the implications of this for susceptibility and trans-
missibility, remain unclear. Significant completely asymp-
tomatic acquisition of full immunity would, however,
require a different model from that adopted here. We
assume that for the nine cases that had a positive swab
result but no record of symptoms, there actually were
symptoms that were not recorded - asymptomatic indivi-
duals were not supposed to be swabbed, and since this is a
small proportion of the sample any assumption made does
not substantially influence the final results. A further
potential source of bias would be other co-circulating
respiratory pathogens; however, the expected level of these
in Birmingham during late Spring and early Summer is
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very low, and so for our study period this is unlikely to
have been important [15,16].
Results and discussion
There are three main sets of results from our statistical
analysis: estimates of transmission probabilities stratified
by household size; an estimate of the population-level het-
erogeneity of infectiousness; and estimates of probabilities
describing case ascertainment.
Figure 3 shows the inferred transmission probabilities
for the full model, which includes the effects of imper-
fect case ascertainment (black circles). Also shown are
the results that would have been obtained using differ-
ent case definitions: symptomatic individuals (blue
upwards-facing triangles) swabbed individuals (green
squares) and individuals with a positive swab result (red
downwards-facing triangles). Each of these three defini-
tions has been used previously by other researchers;
while some studies presented results using different case
definitions, our work is unique in combining different
definitions with a model of case ascertainment to pro-
vide an explicit estimate of transmission probability.
Using the full model, we arrive at a ‘true’ SAR of 39.7
[34.9,44.0]%, compared to 16.0[13.4,18.7]% for PCR, 35.2
[31.4,39.1]% for influenza-like illness (ILI), and 51.9
[47.5,56.4]% for ARI.
The variance in infectiousness of cases is shown in the
left-hand panel of Figure 4. The interpretation of this het-
erogeneity parameter, θ, is in general quite technical; but if
it takes the value zero then each case has exactly the same
infectiousness, while variability increases with θ so that if
its value is close to one then the top 10% of cases are
more than twenty times as infectious over the total course
of their infection as the bottom 10%. While there is a lot
of uncertainty in our estimate of θ, all of the values in the
95% CI represent significant population-level heterogene-
ity in infectiousness.
The probabilities relevant to case ascertainment are
shown in the right-hand panel of Figure 4. We consider
these in turn. Our estimates are that for cases of influenza
A(H1N1)pdm09, 27[24,30]% were not swabbed, and of
those that were 42[38,47]% did not return a positive swab.
This is qualitatively consistent with the serological work of






















































Figure 2 Final size data. The final size data (that is, frequency distribution of total number of cases by household size) for different
classifications of cases: Laboratory confirmation through PCR; being swabbed (most likely due to meeting HPA ILI diagnostic criteria); having any
ARI symptoms; and inferred in the statistical model. Histograms are stratified by household size. ARI, acute respiratory infection; HPA, Health
Protection Agency; ILI, Influenza-like illness.
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means that a quantitative comparison cannot be made.
Our estimate for the baseline attack rate with non-
H1N1pdm09 ARI over the relevant time period is 3
[0.3,7]%, which is again broadly consistent with other
work [15,16]. Concerning non-H1N1pdm09 cases of ARI,
our estimate of the proportion swabbed contains too
much uncertainty to inform policy on the basis of the
dataset considered.






























Figure 3 Transmission probabilities. Transmission probabilities for different household sizes by three different case definitions and inferred in













































Figure 4 Other epidemiological parameters. Left: Heterogeneity, defined as population-level variance in infectiousness. Right: case
ascertainment probabilities. Point estimates and 95% CI for the full model are shown for all parameters.
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Finally, in addition to the original data, Figure 2 shows
the inferred distribution of H1N1pdm09 final size-prob-
abilities (black circles). An important feature of these dis-
tributions is that they are often bimodal rather than
unimodal, that is they look more like the letter ‘u’ than the
letter ‘n’. It is this unusual shape that allows for more
information to be extracted from household final-size data
than is available for crude population-level estimates of
prevalence and incidence without household stratification.
Conclusions
In this study, we have analyzed the household-stratified
early infection patterns for pandemic influenza in inner-
city Birmingham, UK. We have used modern computa-
tionally-intensive statistical methods to fit a realistic
model for transmission, and our comprehensive litera-
ture search [see Additional file 1] indicated that our
approach to modelling the case ascertainment of influ-
enza A(H1N1)pdm09 is novel and provides valuable
additional information.
Three key conclusions can be drawn from our work.
First, the level of within-household transmission can be
estimated directly, despite difficulties in case ascertain-
ment. An estimate of this quantity is important if anti-
virals are distributed prophylactically to household
contacts of cases; if there is little transmission within
the household then such a policy is less likely to be
effective and vice versa.
Considering our results, we arrive at a ‘rule of thumb’
for the H1N1pdm09 pandemic that transmissibility lies
somewhere between what would be predicted from the
HPA definition of ILI (swabbed) and a less specific report-
ing of ARI symptoms (symptomatic). Our results therefore
provide evidence that relying solely on laboratory-con-
firmed cases is excessively stringent and consistently leads
to under-estimation of transmission, as would be expected
from serological work [17,18]. An additional consequence
of relying on laboratory confirmation is that given this
case definition, the transmission probabilities do not
decline swiftly as household size increases, while our full
model shows a reduction in transmission probability as
household size increases, as expected, with the exception
of household size seven (we did not find any direct cause
for this anomaly). The question of the relative importance
of large households for epidemic spread remains signifi-
cant, and while pre-pandemic analysis of seasonal influ-
enza suggested decline with size [19,20], this was not a
consistent observation during the pandemic as seen in
[21] and our literature review [see Additional file 1]. Study
design may be an important part of variability [21], and
our results show that case ascertainment is also relevant.
As part of estimating the transmission process, we
also calculated the probability of a false negative PCR
result. Forty-two percent of infected cases are estimated
to have had a negative laboratory test, which has signifi-
cant public health importance, and may have been
caused by a combination of a number of factors includ-
ing: problems encountered with taking the swabs
[22,23]; swabbing individuals who were not in the early
stages of their illness [24]; and potentially swabbing
individuals with milder forms of illness. Exploring these
factors could also be the focus of future work.
Secondly, our analysis provides additional support for
the picture of the recent influenza pandemic as one
with highly variable clinical outcomes, including signifi-
cant numbers of cases who did not meet the HPA’s
diagnostic criteria, but are likely to have been true cases,
and a high variance in the infectiousness of cases, that is
there were many cases who were not particularly infec-
tious, while a relatively small minority had an extremely
high probability of passing influenza on to their house-
hold contacts.
Finally, and most significantly, our approach could be
used in future outbreaks as a rapid complement to sero-
logical work. Serology provides an important indepen-
dent test of clinical surveillance methods, but is costly
and the correct epidemiological interpretation of an
individual’s titre is not always clear. Our methods are
inexpensive and model the epidemiology of disease
transmission directly, giving the potential for an early
snapshot of the proportion of cases ascertained.
While we have given certain questions priority in our
analysis, as is unavoidable, there are factors that were not
captured in our model. We believe that the stratification
of cases by age is the most significant omission from our
analysis, while other potentially important factors are
estimation of between-household transmission and the
efficacy of interventions such as encouragement of perso-
nal hygiene measures and use of antiviral drugs. In gen-
eral, inclusion of these additional complexities will lead
to stratification of our transmission estimates by age,
time to treatment and prophylaxis and so on, in addition
to household size, but these may still on average be simi-
lar to our unstratified estimates. The expectation from
our literature review would be for lower transmission
among those given antivirals early and adults than those
given antivirals late and children, but the often subtle
effects of transmission dynamics mean that this can only
be conjectured in the absence of a full analysis.
Ultimately, our ability to extend the model relies on
sufficient data being available. Our data are of good qual-
ity, but still only contain a finite amount of information.
Furthermore, as highlighted there is some missing data
on which individuals were managed after 18 June, and
therefore treated on the basis of clinical suspicion rather
than swabbed. In our review of the literature on house-
hold transmission of pandemic influenza [see Additional
file 1] we found many studies, involving between them
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several thousand cases and household contacts, that pro-
duced relevant data. Of these, only a small fraction fitted
a transmission model to extract generalizable epidemio-
logical conclusions.
The current UK Influenza Preparedness Strategy stresses
the need for rapid research early in a pandemic to improve
understanding and inform response, and to develop appro-
priate protocols for such research [1]. We suggest that
protocols for collection, sharing and meta-analysis of
household data should form part of this preparedness. The
data for the studies we found were mostly collected before
the end of June 2009. Much of the information collected
during these studies, in particular syndromic information
and household stratification, was not reported and used at
the time. An internationally co-ordinated meta-analysis of
household data during July 2009, fitting transmission para-
meters and adjusting for case definitions so that meaning-
ful comparisons could be made across different
demographic and healthcare contexts, could have provided
useful information about the pandemic at relatively low
cost. In particular, these estimates of disease transmission
could be used in a timely fashion to guide changes in pub-
lic health management strategies, which in England in
2009 were made only in areas where there was evidence of
sustained community transmission.
Additional material
Additional file 1: Literature Review. PDF containing the literature
review.
Additional file 2: Technical Appendix. PDF containing the technical
background to the work.
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